

RESISTANCE

THE SWEEP OF HISTORY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF A REASONABLE POLITICS

WERE WE NOT INURED TO THE CONTENTS of newspapers—that is, what constitutes public news and events—it would surely be a harsh awakening in the morning for us to return from our somewhat matter-of-fact private lives to the public world: to read these newspapers of war, preparations for war, political trials, suppression of freedom, preparation for unemployment, manoeuvres for national political power and imperialist world power. If we are impressed by anything, after the initial reaction of absurdity and horror, we are impressed perhaps by the apparent futility of an individual in such a world as this.

That is, we have some clear ideas, many of us, of what we would like to see, how we would like to live, how we would like to live with others; these seem elementary, based in our nature and our needs. And then we pick up a magazine and read "An Introduction to the Problem of Guided Missiles"; or some friend of ours is now in prison because he sees no sense to people killing people. And we know very well that our strength, as individuals or within groups of individuals, is a very small thing beside the seemingly limitless strength of a government supported by a hundred odd million people; beside the "logic" by which this government and the people who submit to it are moving relentlessly toward war.

It is the facts like these—and we cannot pretend they are other than facts—that every month causes more liberals and radicals to modify their hopes, their positions, and lamentably often, ultimately their whole allegiance, attitudes, even personalities. We find here the problem as posed recently by Dwight Macdonald in *politics* magazine. Now Macdonald describes himself as an anarchist and a pacifist, and would seem to have gone the length of the logic of these ideas. But we find Macdonald puzzled by the Russian-American "dilemma": what position can a radical (anarchist, pacifist) take toward the Berlin blockade and airlift? toward the Marshall plan? and, ultimately the question has to be asked, toward the war? And Macdonald poses the problem desperately: Is it not so that our position is "politically irrelevant," has meaning only

because we feel committed to our irrelevant morality.

Yes! it is true: Munich or war is the business of States, the imperialist policies of States are the business of States, we cannot expect to be able to (when we have thought we could, we were wrong) map out a "better" or "good" course for a State to follow in international diplomacy and war. Yes; it is true that the whole force of modern nations, the whole sweep of history as it were, is driving toward war. In fact, viewed from within this history, in terms of the economic and political interests of rulers, in terms of the mass psychology of subjects, atomic war is a question of time only. From a historical point of view, we can very nearly speak of the inevitability of the coming war. Surely there is no ground for believing that this or that American policy in Europe or in regard to Russia is going to influence this decisive question.

Then what are we doing, if these things are, in this sense, "inevitable"? It seems that we are driven to one of two directions: We choose deliberately among the lesser evils of history and the war, and say: This I will support. But then the thing we find ourselves supporting is War, the State, destruction, slavery; and under the march of these, human freedom and individuality, and all the things that we prize for themselves, are crushed as they have been crushed for years. We may take this practical position, and we know it is the custom to do so. For reasons far beyond logic, people tend to revert to "the herd" (as Bourne said) at the point of war, however far they were away from it before.

But this is not the *only* choice: that is, to support Russia or America is not the only alternative. Holding a belief in the possibility of another kind of life, holding the belief that war is inevitable only in the lives of State and not in the lives of people, not really caring what the topography and boundaries of the earth are on the day after the next atomic war, we can dissociate ourselves from these States, this institutional machinery that is driving toward war, withdraw ourselves from these forces, assert our individuality, cut ourselves away from the herd, live by the things we think are good and right, and

use our every means and strength to persuade others to like living and action.

Our task does not thereby become easier (how people resist becoming individuals! how much they prefer to be in the war-like herd! such is our training). But our work becomes clear, and we can see very plain objectives, very plain possibilities—possibilities worth the small chance that, we must admit, we have.

First of all, by separating ourselves from the war-herd, rejecting responsibility for Society and the State (not the miserable "critical supporters") we become by that much, by whatever our strength is, a check on the madness of this State: a check on the power it dares assume over its citizens, on the repression it meets rebels with. To Macdonald his main enemy is in Moscow; but it is not possible to attack the enemy in Moscow except through the American State; whereas we can attack the immediate, visible enemy in America by refusing allegiance to it, by standing outside it, by mustering all the strength and numbers we can—the numbers that matter, not numbers of petitions, but numbers of individuals who will act as such.

Second we provide a rallying ground for all those to whom war and the current directions of Societies and States are inhuman, to all those with other aspirations; and with them we can hope to keep alive some sensible, human, reasonable, ideas in a world that is dominated by the "common sense" of war.

Third, we look to what is finally the only way out of the dilemma. If we scoff at this exit, we should realize that we are accepting the reality and permanence of the State that is. Yet it is precisely, ultimately, through the disaggregation of the war-herd into thinking, reasoning individuals who know what they want and have no concern for the needs of abstractions like Society and the State—it is precisely through the emergence from Society of rebellious individuals, that is, a genuine revolution and dissolution of the State and all the aspects of society that are involved in it, that we can hope to achieve a happier way of life.

What a remote possibility this seems! Yet let us not forget that this is the one exit—that the rest is dilemma.

OBEDIENCE TO GOD Obedient to the words of Spellman, large sections of the American population and government again underwent hysteria. A certain cardinal in Hungary was being tried by the Stalinist government for the crime of plotting rebellion. Official propaganda seemed confused whether the cardinal was an innocent victim or a hero of rebellion: after all, there was little implausible about the accusations against the cardinal. But all this did not matter: rebellion to tyranny, said Spellman, is obedience to God.

At approximately the same time, in Madrid, a Spaniard described by the press as an anarchist (and a hero of the French resistance during the recent war) was sentenced to death by the Catholic government of Franco, for rebellion to tyranny ("anarchist activities," the press said); a number of his comrades were sentenced to long terms in the same trial. A few paragraphs was all that was given to this news.

At the same time, also, in New York, eleven leaders of the Communist Party were on trial for their liberty for the crime of plotting rebellion (so the government attorneys say) against the government of the United States.

Now, just a little later, the trial of a group of Protestant ministers by the Stalinist government of Bulgaria became a new cause célèbre in the American press: again mysterious "confessions" to be explained; new instances of Stalinist tyranny.

But at the same time (and this has been going on for several years) the concentration camps of Stalinist Bulgaria have been full of our anarchist comrades, whose crime (likewise) has been rebellion against tyranny. In this case, however, rebellion is occasioned by a desire for freedom, rather than for Christian tyranny along the lines practiced by Franco. The twenty years' war of the Bulgarian anarchists against native fascists, Nazi and Stalinist governments has attracted no notice in America, and the American press maintains complete silence about this rebellion to tyranny and about the fate of the rebels. Nor, it goes without saying, has Spellman had words to say on this subject.

What is wanting is that Spellman should rephrase his motto to read: "Defense of the Church is obedience to God." But then the Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis would not be so eager to join his religious crusade.

THE STRANGE CASE OF LYSENKO It seems that the Russian government, which very

frankly regulates the findings of science in a Stalinist direction, has found in favor of the doctrines of a certain Prof. Trofim D. Lysenko. Now all this is notorious: this is clearly tyranny, that a scientist who disagrees with Lysenko will be fortunate to be ignored. Russia has its "official" genetics.

But if we flip this coin over, we find: America also has its official genetics! We are not geneticists, but this news item strikes us as outrageous:

Corvallis, Ore. (AP), Feb. 23.—Dr. A. L. Strand, president of Oregon State University, said today that he had dismissed an associate chemistry professor for supporting the genetics teaching of Prof. Trofim D. Lysenko, the Russian Communist.

... Dr. Strand said that Dr. (Ralph) Spitzer, in a letter to The Chemical and Engineering News of Jan. 31, supported the 'charlatan' Lysenko in opposition to the world's leading geneticists.

"Any scientist who has such poor power of discrimination so as to choose to support Lysenko's genetics against all the weight of the evidence against it is not much of a scientist or has lost the freedom that an instructor or investigator should possess," Dr. Strand said.

Let us not become confused: Dr. Spitzer is not headed for a concentration camp. But it is clear that American journalists, and the American public, are no more geneticists than ourselves. Yet the "official biology" of the American press and public is Mendelian (as even a public opinion poll could verify). Assertion has convinced that Mendelianism is Truth; and just such imposition of knowledge (true or false) upon lay ignorance is the basis for the general purification of science.

What is more, we know that ideology is neither rational nor chance. It would be interesting to explore the reasons why Mendelianism is as dear to America as Lysenkoism is dear to Russia.

THE CASE OF AXIS SALLY It is perhaps a minor incident, this trial of "Axis Sally" going on down in Washington, D. C.

One is hard pressed to restrain contempt for such tools of the Nazis. Yet the story is apparently a somewhat simple one: "Among other experiences, she said, she 'existed on crackers and apples for months' while attending a Cleveland dramatic school and working as a salesgirl for \$15 a week. She testified that after years of struggle in pursuit of her stage career, in this country and abroad, she was finally caught up in the war in Europe and went to work for the Berlin radio in May, 1940, because she was jobless and 'the wolves were getting closer every day.'"—AP, Washington, Feb. 23 (Times of 2-24). No need to sentimentalize; but it is strange that no one sees in Mildred E. (Axis Sally) Gillars the neurosis of the society and the individual that is there plain to see.

But to draw something more out of this, the latest in a series of treason trials: By what right does the American government presume to try this woman for treason? Where this "treason"? At the Nuremberg trials the doctrine was enunciated that an individual was responsible, could not hide behind his State: in other words, that treason is nothing, it is what a person does. Yet it is not for what she did in Berlin that Axis Sally is being tried: simply and clearly because she was born in America, and was therefore an American citizen (for Germany is surely full of former Nazi propagandists whose heads are still secure). Clear demonstration that the Nuremberg doctrine was intended only as justification for what the American government desired to do: against its own citizens it applies laws of treason and demands patriotism; from those who happen to live behind the iron curtain of the moment it demands rebellion, treason, unpatriotism. The moral question disappears; what appears is the American State, employing such ideas and weapons as lie handy.

THE CASE OF GARRY DAVIS Axis Sally is a cloudy case, for the thing she gave allegiance to was surely an evil one, and the

most that can be said for her is that she is a pathetic victim of this world. The problem comes into sharper focus when we pass to such a one as Garry Davis, who wishes to have no more to do, not only with his "own" government but with any of the States of the world. Presumably, if this were a government "of the people," those who "own" it would have the right to "disown" it.

Ask ourselves: What would be the condition of Garry Davis if, instead of championing the acceptable sloganistic idea of world government, he had simply said he was opposed to these governments and would have nothing more to do with them? Or suppose that Garry Davis had not, in effect, made himself a refugee from America before declaring himself. Suppose he was in this country, announced that as a "world citizen" he wasn't going to allow himself to be conscripted into the American army: we know the results. During the recent war at least one young American of draft age formally notified the American government that he was returning his citizenship to it; the government ignored him, put him in prison.

It is the declared intention of the American State to harness its citizenry to its destinies—as the 16 men currently in prison, and 50 more under arrest, for draft resistance attest.

ANARCHISTS AND THE STATE The question of man and the State, of anarchists and the State, has been well stated in

the first issue of a new anarchist review in France, *Etudes anarchistes*:

"Originally, anarchism took the form of a demand linked to the misery of the lower levels of the nation, a demand which had before it time to achieve its triumph. Capitalism would stand still, frozen, always identical, until the will of the masses for liberation would batter down the structure of exploitation. Now, in the present world tragedy, amid war and the State, anarchism has acquired this profound significance: the last solution to save the existence of man himself. Anarchism was, once, simply the hope of betterment, of liberation; it has become the sole guarantee of the survival of humanity, and the question of its triumph has become identical with the question of the triumph of human life over the gravediggers of exploitation, dictatorship, famine and war.

"Thus the whole of modern society has tended to disclose the two poles around which the forces of destruction have organized: man and the State. The split of Marxism into totalitarian and libertarian thought, the transformation of the deep meaning of anarchism, all contribute to the definition of the fundamental dilemma: behave as a man or as a cog of the State, struggle for man or struggle for the State that devours man and destroys him on the fields of battle and the concentration camp.

"All those apparent half-way choices between man and the State—the watered-down liberty of the democracies and free enterprise, the absolute virtues of the bourgeoisie, the social-democratic reformism which is only democracy with social pretensions—all these palliatives, these ambiguities, are relentlessly collapsing. One is for man—libertarian—or totalitarian. The self-styled middle of the road is unstable, it drives men inevitably toward one of the poles.

"Thus has history concentrated in these two words—man and the state—the whole meaning of social action. The State tends to encroach each day on individual liberty by its decrees, its nationalizations, its surveillance over citizens, frontiers and labor, its taxes, its irresponsible decisions to prepare for vast international wars, finally the growing militarization of every activity of the country. The imperialism of the State toward man is an imperialism of day-to-day. The action of anarchists must therefore also be an action of day to day, an action of man without mediator, of man directly engaged in struggle, without screen of party: *direct action*.

"For when man submits his action to the absolute authority of party or State, Church or bible, politicalized trade union or political man, he submits to determination of his fate by the Statist pole of society, and his action (good intentions regardless) becomes one of the factors contributing to the evolving totalitarian State."

The Bombed Mind

THE DEVASTATION OF GERMANY IS NEARLY complete. Whole sections of her cities have been wiped out. Street after street consists of burned-out houses, unsupported walls, enormous heaps of rubble. The ruins have been photographed and publicized. But pictures merely reveal the discrepancy between old building-techniques and modern forces of destruction. Neither human- nor camera-eyes can see what really happened; they can only perceive the residue, the heap of ashes after the fire.

Ruins are accepted as the new reality for the next fifty years to come, only slowly to be changed into more bearable places to live. Already some patchwork is being done. New store fronts begin to hide part of the damage; some houses are propped up while others are torn down before they collapse. Bricks are piled into veritable mountains for future use. Here and there glass replaces cardboard in window-frames. Furniture is repaired and even paint is used again.

It is not the sight of destruction and discomfort which troubles the minds of the people. They are still able to smile at a bathtub or toilet suspended in the air on pipes like grotesque ornaments decorating the even more grotesque ruins. With both pity and interest they watch the open-air apartments of houses that have lost one wall where people must measure their steps in order to stay alive, where they cook, wash, and mend in view of all. They may even be able to discern a strange beauty in the ruined cities at night. In the light of the moon, particularly, they take on the appearance of fantastic surrealistic constructions. The vagueness of the varied shapes and shades—the poetry of TNT—at once hides many secrets and reveals gruesome but fascinating visions.

The imagination, however, is bound to the past; the terror of the bombing still occupies the mind. There is nothing they fear to remember so much and yet they must talk about it again and again. When the big block-busters hit the street, the whole earth trembled. Houses were lifted up, others swayed back and forth before they crashed. Then there was just heat and fire. The air was sucked up and the day turned into night as smoke floated over the cities. It rained cinders, and from the collapsing buildings billowed slowly-descending clouds of impenetrable, blinding dust. The very ground became so hot the asphalt melted. People could no longer run to their death, no longer breathe in order to run. They did not die like people but disintegrated like the wood, steel and stone that cities are made of.

Trapped in their basements under tons of bricks, they did not burn but slowly roasted and shrank to the size of large loaves of brown bread, their children resembling so many fried chickens. There was safety in neither basement nor bunker. People were ordered into them so that the panic-stricken might be controlled and notice taken of the defeatists. There they were down on their knees, blankets

around their heads, scared to death and waiting for the all-clear signals.

Digging into the rubble they saw their own end in the shrivelled bodies of the dead. When would their luck end? Was this the last time they would hurry into the darkness of the bunker: How long could it go on like this? With no opportunity for revolt, there was only hatred that sought satisfaction in kicking a dead Allied flier or in lynching the wounded.

The ruins, then, show only the stage, not the tragedy. To the latter belong the misery and helplessness of the people—the lost limbs and burned-out eyes, the terrified children and the mothers gone mad. Now the play of hell has ended, people can sleep again, and the smell of death is almost gone. But the scenery still stands to feed the memory with endless details of the gruesome drama it once embraced.

Although the over-all picture is terrible, parts of it, at first sight, are bearable and even pleasant. The trees that escaped the ax try to live again. They have been bent, their crowns were shot away, their roots laid open and yet they manage to bring forth new leaves and fresh branches, to hide with their green the grey of the rubble. The many parks have been transformed into vegetable plots; even the playgrounds grow potatoes through the hard efforts of their inexperienced cultivators. Tomato plants adorn the remaining balconies and patched-up rooftops, soaking up the bad waters of rotting faucets. In winter, however, these illusions end. More trees are hacked down. The snow hides nothing; it sets in sharper relief the bent black figures carrying bundles of firewood over the desert-emptiness of the destroyed parks into the stillness of the ruins.

Some streets still try to restore their past grandeur. Cinemas, theatres, galleries and luxury-stores have reappeared. But a closer look reveals that the display is merely a mortician's make-up on dead cities. The art is that of the occupiers, the luxury belongs to them. Western movies and plays, Russian theory and propaganda are patronized in order to get rid of the value-losing currency. Beautiful clothes in shop-windows command black-market prices, which reduces the possible customers to a handful of racketeers and the well-paid of the Allied armies. The porcelain, rings, toys and knickknacks on display are merely shabby remnants of ransacked private collections.

Once again people sit in street cafes to see and be seen. They have some colored water before them and perhaps some artificial-looking food, but this has nothing to do with eating and drinking. A certain degree of elegance is still displayed, but being of black-market origin, it is at once suspect and disliked. At any rate, the picture is continually upset by numerous beggars and cripples, the badly-clothed, and by the clanking of wooden shoes.

There is a strange complacency in the unsmiling faces of the people and a hard determination to stay alive. Their very existence seems like a miracle to them; a repetition of their experiences is unimaginable. Not daring to hope for another escape, they refuse to contemplate the future. Unable to avoid the political life, they try to ignore it by acting and talking as they are told. Their short-run outlook is concerned with only a very

limited, private world: the family, the village, the sector, the city, the zone at the most. Anything more than that seems meaningless, and their excited controversies are related only to the private and direct interests that lie behind social issues. The "democrats" and the "totalitarians" are neither one nor the other. Under Russian control they obey the rules, under Western tutelage they pay lip-service to ideas that they see violated every day. Displaying one or another "conviction" merely means they are hired by one or another of the controlling powers. Ideas are for sale and all arguments are hollow.

Political parties and trade-unions have been resurrected. But for all they mean, they are still as dead as the skeletons under unexplored ruins. Organizations have returned in the same sense that "peace" has come back, and they are equally unreal. They are engaged in make-believe activities, lucrative to some, boring to the rest. All activity, however, seems superfluous and not only because of the impending war. Production here, dismantling there; exports from the poor, imports for the rich; reform of the money-reform in order to shorten rations through the abolition of the rationing system; strikes against closed factories; hungry eyes and empty pockets in sight of food; tanks and riot guns for Marshall planners and uranium mines for Stalin's new subjects. Nothing makes sense. There is no future in anything. Because of this deep despair, people continue to do mechanically what is demanded of them. Tired and numb, they follow the familiar slogans and the old organizations. Their chief activity is their all-inclusive passivity.

All hope has been bombed away. No promise is taken seriously. There is disbelief in their voices when they speak of revival. The control of the Ruhr may have significance for the former owners and the present trustees. It has no meaning for the homeless peddlers who hang around railway stations to sell, buy, and sell again in order to acquire an extra bar of chocolate, an extra pack of cigarettes which in turn will be exchanged for bread at the next corner. What would the end of occupation mean? Merely that there would be other troops, ready to shoot at German commands. It is not simply Germany but the world that is occupied and terrorized. No change is conceivable within the national framework; no peace or betterment can be expected within the habitual social relations.

Problems are raised only to be dropped. The people are lost both individually and collectively. Organizations almost automatically turn against the organized. Retreat into privacy merely means to die unobserved. How to be human without being political? how to act in unison without dictates and obedience? how to construct a phalanx of decent people despite the increasing bitterness of the struggle of all against all? how to do the necessary which is obviously also the good? Questions, questions and no answers. Ideologies are in ruins like the cities—a rubble-heap of ideas which nobody knows how to carry away. There is neither room nor occasion for new thoughts; in any case, not yet. There is still the waiting between the raids, the immobility between the bursting of the bombs.

PAUL MATTICK.

The Guillotine at Work

Any means originally employed
"for the sake of the end"
tends to become the end.

Continually employed, the means
becomes the end: by repeated acts
habit arises, strengthens, and maintains
itself: the Soviet State arises
"for the sake of the classless society";
the Che-Ka employs torture
"for the sake of the State";
the State begins to function
for the sake of torture.

Young men, idealist
warriors of Trotsky's army:
under the White Guard torture
you died, for the sake of—torture.
The mystery is unavoidable:
every act must be
"such as we wd will for its own sake."

JACKSON MAC LOW.

The Prisoner

When he shouts for a candle
Childhood's closet of dread is brought him
And when it is love, love he calls for,
Saying, O let me poise in thy poignant moments,
A vended virgin, soured and squirming,
Eyelids tied in a freezing fast of tears,
At Cana turns again to water bridal wine
Maledicts the moon her tides

He is designated by mirrors
Whose inexhaustible regressions cry from a past
His fellows try to disremember
The copious hands, the bruised but open heart
Then vistas shattered like seven years glass

For an age he had no companions
Other than a Tree of Heaven
Steeled in the prisonyard of suffering
With pick and shovel, and a love-cry's echo
(But substance behind it, in that sultry valley
Where corn sprouted and cow's udder was ample—
Is she there still, proclaiming her expletive eyes?)
Echo sounding down narrow strict corridors
Into the ogre's bedroom of alienation . . .
These the breadth and depth of his prison

These enjoin him in space
Release him
As gloom released an owl's vision
And, again, these shrink manwide space
To a grim leer of teeth drawn with no teeth behind them

He quarters initials by his cot
Against loneliness, calls them dragon and saint.
But these prove hardly a shoulder to stain with kisses.
The saint succumbs on his stylite; only the dragon
Survives—the dragon in its whirling rage.

BOB STOCK.

The Reasoning Men

THE METHODS OF SCIENCE APPLIED BY MEN of science have produced many remarkable successes in the field of natural science. If these same men, trained and skilled in these same methods, possessed of calm and rational objectivity and analysis, were to concentrate on the social and the economic and the political problems before us, it is far more likely that they rather than the political, financial, military and labor leaders could set this world chaos in order. Through all history, the latter have tried and failed; given less of a chance the scientists could certainly do no worse.

This myth, which was only casually discussed before Hiroshima, has since received wider discussion and favor. An added argument in these fearful days of Earth-smashing weapons is that such power cannot be trusted to the military. Only the scientists who conceived, planned and created these weapons have any clear awareness of potential and actual dangers involved and of the limitations. The test of this specious logic may be found in the writings of the scientists themselves.

Soon after the horrible effects of the atomic bombs on Japan were revealed, the atomic scientists were jolted into some feeling of remorse—perhaps into an examination of their moral and ethical position. They formed an Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists with Dr. Albert Einstein as their chairman. Their purpose as stated is that:

We scientists believe that a clear and widespread understanding of the facts and implications of the atomic discoveries is indispensable to a reasonable public stand on questions of international politics. We believe that with such understanding, the American people will choose from among many paths to reach a peaceful solution and that they will move toward such a solution and not toward war.

To further this educational ambition the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists began publishing, supported by a grant from the Emergency Committee.

The foremost atomic scientists in the world (even Russians on occasion) have contributed articles to this publication. An examination of the twelve issues of volume 4 (1948) offers a reasonable test of the ability of the scientific mind to assemble some order from social chaos. Does the myth have any base?

The very least we can expect from a scientifically trained intellect is that when presented with a problem shot through by confusion, prejudice and self-interest, a mental enema is in order and then a fresh start. If any criteria have ever been held up before scientists, decent principles have been implicit in them all: never to accept authority uncritically, to reject dogma and myth, to act with cooperation and mutual aid, to ignore national boundaries, to behave honestly in work and with feeling toward mankind. Yet in "hot" wars scientists have responded to the flags and the slogans as blindly as the "lesser" men, and in this "cold" war they show equally little desire to give up the fables and folklore and start afresh.

The penetrating minds of these men probe the depths of mud puddles. Their searching inquiry never achieves the profound analysis of a Harper's Monthly article. Occasionally, of course, something


clear and encouraging must break through, but these are so few as to be lost and found only by painful searching. Generally the articles (and their writers) fall into five groups. Dr. Einstein is, apparently, chief spokesman for the World Government contingent. There is no doubt that (except for one lone voice in this maddening wilderness) this group is the most revolutionary in its principles and implications. In an article entitled *A Plea for International Understanding*, Dr. Einstein says that ". . . As long as contact between the two camps is limited to the official negotiations I can see little prospect of an intelligent agreement, since considerations of national prestige as well as the attempt to talk out of the window for the benefit of the masses make reasonable progress almost impossible."

In place of official negotiations, Einstein sees the solution in ". . . persons who are accustomed to the objective approach to a problem and who will not be confused by exaggerated nationalism or other passions . . . to come together for informal discussions." He must admit, however, that the enforced separation of the people is one of the major obstacles. Whatever the obvious weaknesses and naive assumptions of the World Government position, no other group of scientists even suggests an anti-national sentiment and all others accept the nation and the state as is—without reservation and without examination.

The Liberal group are the modifiers and compromisers. Urey and Shapley are the most articulate of this section with Condon as their *cause célèbre*. They seem content to piddle around with appeals for fairer loyalty board hearings, calls for concerted political activity by scientists, and lobbying to win over politicians.

Another group operates on a legalistic level. Their primary concerns are such issues as the McMahon Act and all the other ramifications of the laws, acts and regulations concerning control of atomic energy, classification of written material and the pros and cons of military vs. civil control. This group also extends itself to discuss U.N. problems, the Baruch plan, the Russian veto, etc. These articles are usually long and involved, and are all well based in the American zone of opinion. Perhaps it wouldn't look well for a practising atomic scientist to be overly critical of the Baruch plan in print.

These three groups all move within the same frame of reference. Their viewpoints overlap in many areas, and their greatest difference is one of emphasis: to strengthen the U.N. by popular pressure, to strengthen the U.N. by liberalizing America, or to strengthen it by just getting it to function on vital issues. But in these proposals the scientists show themselves to be no more clear-headed than any run of the mill political seer. We may find "liberals" more pleasant dinner companions than communists, more agreeable friends than reactionaries, and more tolerant rulers than fascists—and most of these scientists fall into the ill-defined liberal camp—and if we are convinced that liberally run governments will settle the problems of the world, then we may believe that scientists can do a fair job of it. But there seems little in their approach and program to warrant any claims for the prowess of the scientific mind. There are plenty of liberals in the world



who reached the same positions without benefit of scientific training. And if most scientists talk liberal, it may be indicative of the peculiar fact that most people (Republicans too) talk liberal.

If there is little encouragement to be found in the Bulletin on the level of social action, the discussions of the individual role of the scientist invoke a sadder and more depressing outlook. Much controversy has appeared centered on the responsibilities of the scientist. Famous names—Oppenheimer, von Laue, Rabi, Bridgman, and others—state opinions. There is a shocking unanimity of opinion. The general attitude is summed up in an article by Oppenheimer: "The scientist is responsible to science . . ." ". . . to the integrity and vigor of his science." Rabi is more blunt and to the point: ". . . our real social responsibility . . . is to do good, sound, honest science and to publish the results . . ." What controversy arises from these statements comes from sociologists, botanists, and historians but not much from other atomic scientists.

Implicit in this general point of view are two damning conclusions. Scientists are a group apart and can have no thought to the uses of their discoveries, and that the way out of disorder must be found by all the rest of society. The second implication is that if scientists should be left to their science then bankers to their banking, shoemakers to their shoemaking, and, unfortunately, politicians to their politics, and military men to their eternal delight in the situation.

It has been suggested by Bridgman, *et al*, that scientists have no way of determining the uses of their discoveries. It is barely possible that not until the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did these

men realize the horror they had unleashed; it is barely possible that they lacked the imagination to translate their energy calculations, the meter-readings and graphed curves into thousands of dead and crippled people. But if they failed in this, then they are worthless as leaders; if they knew before and permitted, they are worthless as men.

The Bulletin did carry an anemic discussion on direct action by scientists. Should scientists turn to non-violence, refuse to work and participate in any way for war purposes—should scientists go on strike against war? Bridgman and Urey again neatly sum up the scientific opinion:

I think it is obvious that the thesis that the scientist is responsible for the uses made of his discoveries must involve the assumption that there is something special in the situation. For certainly in more common situations individual responsibility is not considered to extend to all consequences that may be initiated by the act of the individual. The miner of iron ore is not expected to see to it that none of the scrap iron which results from his labors is sold to the Japanese to be used against this country. Such an extension of responsibility would be absurd.

Urey says:

I object to this line of action . . . because it involves an attempt by scientists to dictate policy to the population of this country . . . because of their beliefs . . . Also, it seems to me that a policy of non-violence undertaken by any section of a community . . . of the Oxford pledge variety . . . is not a way to secure peace. It is a way to lose the next war, if it comes.

Bridgman states the negation of what we should hold to be the truth. It is certainly time for individuals to accept the responsibility for all the consequences that may be initiated by an act of the individual. And Urey distorts this individual action by responsible scientists into a coercive act by a group of scientists. Such is not the case. The individual who behaves honestly and responsibly is dictating to no one.

The one voice not wholly lost in this maddening wilderness is that of Norbert Wiener. In a letter printed in the *Atlantic* for December, 1946, he said:

. . . If, therefore, I do not desire to participate in the bombing and poisoning of defenseless peoples—and I most certainly do not—I must take a serious responsibility as to those to whom I disclose my scientific ideas . . . I do not expect to publish any future work of mine which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible militarists . . .

Recently the Bulletin asked him to make a statement concerning his present position. Wiener made it and it was printed in the November 1949 issue.

. . . I repeat, a man who is not willing to take moral responsibility for his acts as a scientist is scarcely the best man to scientific responsibility. The enormous scale of modern science offers a splendid opportunity for the old army game on responsibility both for the truth of one's own constructions and for the consequences of one's own policy . . . In view of this, I still see no reason to turn over to any person, whether he be an army officer or the kept scientist of a great corporation, any results which I obtain if I think they are not going to be used for the best interests of science and of humanity. I realize, of course, that my control of my own work is not as complete as I would have it, and that there are situations in which it is scarcely worthwhile closing the stable door after the horse has been classified. Nevertheless, in every case in which my policy can be of any effect, I intend to act on what seems to me to be the most responsible basis on which I can.

C. A. G.

To Young Resisters

Dear friends,

Let me make a few personal remarks to you young men in the throes of deciding *how* to resist the war and the draft. (That we must resist them is not in question.) A friend of mine has just again been put in jail for avowed non-registration, and I am concerned about you others who are likewise set on "enlisting in jail," as it seems to me—as if you approved more highly of penal institutions than of the army. I have heard the arguments for such public affirmation of principle, but they do not strike home to me. Now the alternative modes of resistance are devious and flexible and do not thrive on publicity. What I say here is not about the alternatives, nor about any objective political or historical advantages or disadvantages; it is addressed to you personally. You may find these remarks presumptuous and offensive, but I do not have the right not to proffer them. I am ashamed to have to discuss in a newspaper, however, what should be discussed individually.

You are set on willingly accepting heavy penalties because of principle. Most of you, I think, do not have the right to hold such hard principles nor willingly to accept such heavy penalties. Right principles are the statements of deep impulses, intuitions, insights into our underlying natures; they come from deeper than our ordinary practice, and therefore we conform our practice to principles to help us realize our deeper natures. Now young men like yourselves have not had the chance to mature and test the principles to live by. It is only independent accomplishment that tests one's principles (the test is, "are they working in me?")—you have not had the time to accomplish enough of your own. What you take to be your principles are largely borrowed ideas, or the expression of various passionate attitudes towards your elders and teachers, or at best the fruit of reasoning. Excuse me, these are harsh sentences, but you will agree it is not a sweet subject.

On the other hand, willingly accepting heavy penalties, *you are violating your primary duty as young people: to seek for animal and social satisfactions and to plunge with youthful enthusiasm into work interesting to you.* You do not have the right to postpone these satisfactions and explorations. To the extent that the State or anything else tries to make you postpone them, you must fight for them by force, cunning, recalcitrance, camouflage, playing dead, flight, etc., like any other healthy creatures we observe in nature.

Again, you prematurely assume a public role. In your "principles" there is always, is there not, a guess at a certain public expectation of you: what people think of you and by reflection what you therefore think of yourselves. This public opinion is disastrous: it gives you a false assurance of rightness and courage when your hearts are really torn by doubt and fear. In general, when in doubt the wise course is delay, avoidance, not to have to make a commitment on the doubtful issue; but on the con-

trary, to throw oneself all the more into good activities that are not at all doubtful, one's life-work, or love, or the quest for them. Now what is the case at present? The vast States of the entire world are embarked on obvious folly, long proved calamitous to mankind. This we must resist. But how possibly can untried young citizens know with inner conviction how to cope with such colossal problems? You do not know; you know you must resist (this a child can grasp) but you do not know how; therefore, to avoid the tension, you embrace "principles" that give you a public picture of yourselves, that let you know what is expected of you as resisters. Then you throw yourselves in jails as sacrifices. No no, go softly; since you are torn by doubt, first rather exhaust every possibility of delay, avoidance, non-commitment; and meanwhile, to relieve the tension, throw yourselves fervently into what you are sure of, interesting work, sociality, love. *It is not necessary for you to be verbally consistent as yet: do not allow yourselves to be public figures. Your own kind of consistency can only emerge with experience and accomplishment; your public force will exert itself with the realization of your inward powers.* Therefore, loosely follow every positive impulse, avoid cooperating with obvious stupidity and evil, and postpone other issues. Have the courage to say to yourselves, "I don't know; I am afraid."

The penalties you think of willingly accepting are disproportionate to your actions as yet; you do not have the right to them. If a young man is a fiery revolutionary, a great champion, then such heavy penalties (one, three, five years in jail) have a certain fitness and beauty: he is a grave offender, a great champion, he runs great dangers, he suffers grave penalties. But most of you have so far done little, you have struck only weak blows for freedom against stupidity and authority. When you are penalized, the feeling is not noble, but ugly: a sense of pity for you, a sense of insensate cruelty of the oppressor. To give color and proportion to its blind fury, the State's attorney tries to elevate you into public enemies, symbols, examples. Do not lend yourselves to this convenient lie. *You are yourselves, not symbols. Your fact is that in our society there are horrible difficulties and obstacles, threats to your joy and creativity; this is your fact, act with your eyes on this.* Certainly there are deep causes underlying this fact, causes to be faced with principled behavior, the principles you live by and may die for as great champions, but you do not yet know them as your own. Do not let either your enemies or your friends prematurely assign "your" principles to you. Stubbornly work for the personal goods that you do know and desire, and your underlying principles will emerge: then will be the time to stand witness to principles.

I have been basing this personal argument on moral considerations of "rights"—your rights to hard principles, to accept punishment, to deserve such heavy penalties—because these considerations


are obviously very important to you. I am passing by the considerations of practical effects—whether your mode or other modes of resistance would be most effective for peace—because I do not know how to estimate these quantities: it seems likely to me that the way of symbolic publicized witnessing and suffering fits more with the present character of people and therefore could have a wider superficial effect, but that the mode of fighting for real (millennial) satisfactions can effect a deeper change. But I cannot omit, finally, the most important matter of all, the state of your feelings.

In feeling, your position and your decision are enviable (I envy them); tho doubtful and fearful, you have occasion to be nearly bursting with pride and joy: and this is the wonderful flooding of life. For you can perform a definite act in a crisis, with justification: approved by your good conscience, cutting loose from the prudential ego that drags us down, and by-passing the animal desires that, as we are brought up, are freighted with guilt. Rarely indeed does the life we lead give us a moment of tears, dread, and glory! Then what kind of envious and spiteful moralist am I to try to dullen your definite act and tarnish your justification?

Good, I challenge you! You are prepared for jail and for worse (the history of other young men proves it). Is it not then just you who, not turning away from your resolution but going beyond it, is it not *just* you who can act with unexampled freedom, energy, and daring in our society that never sees these things and is hungry to be moved by them? Your crisis is the means of releasing wonderful powers of nature, because you have faced what is awful. (What is there now to fear; say lightly, "We are living on velvet!") To use these powers, releasing still new powers in yourselves and us, not in the infertile place of a jail, but in our general world productive of opportunities for life.

Whichever way, may you thrive in the creation of the heavens and the earth.

PAUL GOODMAN.



Die beiden raufende Paare, by Hanns Ulrich Franck (1656)

Reflections on Draft Resistance

GOODMAN ENUNCIATES HERE A POINT OF view that some of us, who are at once anti-conscription and outside pacifist circles and habits of thought, have wished to express and have refrained from expressing. (One does not lightly attack, even on points of tactics, those on our side of an issue.) Though it would not occur to me, or to others of the *Resistance* group, to express ourselves in Goodman's thought, we like to see this side brought out, we begin to approach a balance. But this subject is intricate, loaded with implications, more remains to be said.

1. Free Men and Citizens

First of all, to face the specific problem: What is a man to do on registration day (for example)? What are the circumstances?

The situation is somewhat as follows: We live in a society of war, organized violence and exploitation, etc., in which we must pick our way with an eye to survival, survival *alive*, to brotherhood, even—we dream—to revolution. But how do we achieve all this? Only, I think, by surviving alive, living brotherly; by extending our community, by acting directly (specifically; directly toward our goals). We are anti-political, we anarchists, in a fuller sense than abstention from politics and disbelief in government; we are concerned, not with a struggle against the State (a struggle that in fact *assumes* the State), but with making our revolution, "creating the new society within the shell of the old," extending our revolution as far through society as we can (and, of course, defending ourselves, and our revolution, against the State by such methods as are appropriate to our anarchist aims).

Now, what is across the way from anarchism, in the (not hostile) pacifist camp, is another spirit. (I am aware that some anarchists are pacifists, and vice versa; I am using the word pacifist, narrowly, to denote those who share the philosophy of Peacemakers, etc.) Pacifists are polarized, we may say, toward the State. Their reflex action, in event of war or conscription, is to "bear witness," "take a public stand," to virtually force the government to imprison them (since it plainly cannot ignore flagrant defiance). It is as though pacifists were offering themselves as sacrifices to deflect the government from its purposes or to propitiate it. The pacifist assumes that one must act so as to demonstrate one's "courage" and "honesty" in terms the DA or a citizen will applaud, rather than to demand respect, on its own terms, for a new ethic; and the "draft-dodger" is angrily repudiated, sometimes tolerated, rarely accepted. "Non-cooperation" is assumed to be a positive, active thing: one non-cooperates *with* the State, "registers one's protest" (at the office of the State); and those pacifists who have learned not to turn themselves in to the FBI have not (as it at first appears) learned to ignore the State, rather they remain at large the better to non-cooperate *with*.

To sum up, the non-registration pacifist behaves as a *citizen* rather than as a *free man*. The free

man, that is, feels no obligation under law. The pacifist feels a certain obligation to the State as representative of an abstract Society, seems to feel an obligation to be imprisoned (sometimes asserts his desire to suffer punishment parallel to that of his fellow man in the army; sometimes glorifies imprisonment under slogans such as "pack the jails"; "anything to fill the prisons"—Milton Mayer). Put another way, the pacifist acts rather as a *reformer* than as a revolutionary, for he is trying to (feels he must) persuade the State to do and be different than it is (he may even hope to persuade it to self-liquidation, the meaning is the same). Though appearing to concern themselves with the individual, pacifists are still concerned, first of all, with the abstractions Society and State.

Let us look again at the actual situation, stripped of abstractions: let us consider the situation of the man who is ordered to register. Here we are, with our work to do, our lives to live, and now they will not let us be. They are preparing for war ("they": the State, politicians, etc., "society" in certain definite senses, "the people")—they insist some of us be soldiers, they insist on compliance and recognition, or prison. Then suppose I, for example, am asked to register for this conscription, what must I do.

But it is clear that I have no obligation, to myself, friends, or others, to register. It is obvious that this conscription is a part of war-preparation, and my total opposition to this I well know. No obligation to register, surely! But am I under some obligation to the government, or to my friends, to give some account of what I did on registration day? Need I prove to the government that I am sincere as the government would define it, brave, etc.? I do not *have to* do anything. Perhaps I will do nothing. I might even be as clever and resourceful as possible at evading questions, arrest, for, after all, the inside of a prison is such and such, and I do not care to be there.

Resistance to the draft can and does have more than a personal meaning—I will come to this. But it is important to emphasize that the man who doesn't want to go into the army has no obligations to the State; he may choose to ignore it completely and merely go about his (tremendously important) business, and in so doing he is acting with the responsibility that one can ask of oneself. Resist, by all means! But resist as free men, not as citizens!

2. Anger

But this does not take all into account. Perhaps, at this time of conscription, there is a greater anger in me—an anger not merely at what they want me to do and want to do to me, but likewise at what is being done to other men. Many of my friends and neighbors, in my same situation, are not aware of the danger, not aware what the draft means, not aware (often true!) that it is possible (even that it is *possible*) to resist. What am I to do. Perhaps I shall write an article for *Resistance*, perhaps I shall stand upon a street corner or a platform and call this thing to the attention of my friends and neighbors and strangers—but still my own anger is not appeased. (I am overage for this draft, and I know that it is not.) Perhaps then I know no better way than this: as a young man (for only a *young* man

has this possibility) I stand before my friends and strangers on the street corner, say to them: Friends! They ask me to do this thing, I will not do it.

We know there is no better propaganda than this.

To make the thought precise: It is not to the State and through the State that our appeal is to be addressed; we have no business to transact with the government; it is to individual men and women that we address ourselves. We make propaganda of our action, not *in order* to be put in prison, but because it is so urgent to speak that the man "does not care" if he is imprisoned. He could not be silent, or would suffer.

3. Compromises

Now, then, suppose a man does not feel he must speak by action; he would like to sound the alarm, but for him the consequences are a heavy thing. What is he to do? Pacifists would have us believe that to fail to make the non-registration protest is equivalent to going into the army: No! The crucial question is still: conscript or non-conscript. There are choices to make, all people (it should go without saying) are not the same. The single-minded pacifist does not allow for this diversity, he is intent on "packing the jails," as though imprisonment were an end! as though we did not wish men to be free, or ourselves!

The choices are for individuals, but let us make a few observations, let us ask the question, Can one really evade this issue (as Goodman proposes).

It does not strike me so. It is not as though, on registration day, one could simply apply for additional time to think it over. Right there the man must make a choice. Some very utilitarian people argue (and they do it), register for the draft, look for legal loopholes and personal escape before resorting to illegality. Leave aside the self-deception that is often present, as also the dubious practicality of these lines of action: consider what this means to a man who is anti-war and anti-State, consider the definite, serious compromise. Or, on the other hand, if a man does not register (that is, if he tries to act like a free man), no matter how inconspicuously, he has committed himself to the extent that he may spend five years in prison.

Surely it is important that a man not seek out jail, martyrs are made often enough, involuntarily; our liberty is not trivial. Yet it is not so that one can really evade the issue—for the alternative to the five-year-illegal act of staying home on registration day is the compromise of registration and cooperation.

Do not think that "merely registering" is nothing at all. Let us never underestimate this, when we consider these "little" compromises of applying for individual exemption, taking another of the government's alternatives: that when we know something to be against our beliefs and self-interests, we slowly destroy ourselves by living someone else's mind and commands—even if we are wrong. (A man will know what he really wants to do, and what he feels he can do.) And we should recognize that if we refuse to compromise, no matter how hard we try to evade situations, we are likely one day to meet law and the State. Yes! there are too many people

in jails already. Also: there are already too many men in the army, there are already too many men doing what they do not want to do.

4. "Political" Acts

It would be more satisfying if the case could be stated more simply. But we are dealing with living men, we are dealing, microscopically, with the greatest issue of our day; ideals can be cut clearly; not so clearly the actions of men.

But Goodman has raised another issue. He argues, in effect, that the business of a young man is to live; politics (in a sense tolerable to us all) is an old man's business. On the face of it this is reasonable: the making of political judgments requires experience that derives from life, while politics and its possible consequences robs the time a young man needs for other things. After all, how can a young man know what is best to do? etc.

However, our environment and our character (as in other things) do not permit us to behave as though in our utopia. Our elders are a generation whose spirit, such as it was, is used up. We do not, in this world, grow slowly into understanding and knowledge of our work and social living; at 18 a man must know what he is to do when the govern-

Ideology and Literature

BEFORE EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF two things, and the influence of the one on the other, it is desirable to try and make as certain as possible what one means by them. By exact definition Ideology means "the science of ideas," and my dictionary adds "visionary speculation." In fact though, Ideology has come to mean a fixed set of ideas often held very near to visionary fanaticism. In practice Ideology, in its common usage, has become synonymous with Political Ideology and has come to denote an attitude of mind and an approach to political and social matters from a particular viewpoint frequently dogmatically adhered to. And it is in this sense that I propose to use the word here.

If it is difficult accurately to define Ideology, it is perhaps even more difficult in the case of literature of which innumerable definitions must exist. The earliest form of literature known to us is the narrative or epic, and the sole object of its creation was to give pleasure to the reader or to the hearer. It was simply a form of entertainment, and as such closely related to the music of the time. (For convenience, and in order not to linger too long on this introductory aspect of the subject, I deliberately exclude the myth and the folk-tale, because they both usually had a religious, that is, an explanatory aim quite as much as that of an entertainment aim, and also because, being a collective form of expression with slight individual variance as permissible, they cannot properly be considered as literature without a qualifying adjective. Furthermore, since literature obtains from the word *literate*, that is composed of the letters of an alphabet, a composi-

ment demands him, by his mid-twenties he may (altogether without wishing it) be familiar with the inside of a prison. He has also to deal with the fact that the condition of man is as it is, that a century of madness is creating its logical effects.

It seems to me wrong that a young man should put away from himself his desire to do something about this oppressing, threatening environment. It seems just that a young man should be "active," "in the movement," and so on: that is, that he should express his anger at what is, act to arouse and awaken the minds of other men, act where it seems to him that good may be done. Doubtless he will begin with over-great hopes, limited understanding, but by doing and acting he will learn. Let him do this with joy (otherwise it has no meaning), let him not forget that he is a young human animal; thereby he will be a great revolutionary.

Surely it is painful to see young rebels, through self-distrust or fear of their own motives, withdraw to themselves and their friends and abandon the work that may be done in the world. Surely we cannot so far despair of our ability to communicate with our neighbors, surely we cannot so far despair of the people we live among. Our knowledge warrants a deeper optimism.

DAVID WIECK.

tion written down in a definitive and unalterable form, it is doubtful whether folk-tale and myth can be classed as literature at all, strictly speaking).

The earliest criterion of literary criticism, therefore, was simply the entertainment value of any given piece of "Literature." It was not until Aristotle elaborating some hints and ideas from Plato, evolved the first theory of aesthetics that literature was ever thought to have any other purpose or even incidental effect, than that of giving pleasure.

I have prefaced this article with these facts and definitions not from any love of pedantry, but because they are of considerably more than merely academic importance to the subject.

To summarize, then. Ideology is the science of ideas, the act of logical speculation, and in particular of ideas concerned with social and political problems and events, combined with speculation as to their probable or desirable development. As such it becomes also an attitude of mind, a way of looking at things, so that we speak of "the ideology" of a particular group or class, or "school" of thought. To define literature, we have agreed is a difficult and tricky task, but for the moment, and for the sake of brevity, we can say that literature is an art form, that its principal aim is to give pleasure and that therefore the form is as important as the content. In the last resort a man writes a story, or puts his thoughts and feelings into literary form, because he enjoys doing so, and the reader reads it because he enjoys doing so—unless, of course, he happens to be paid to read it.

But a writer, or any other artist, has ideas about

life like anyone else. Inevitably he forms opinions, beliefs, that is he develops an Ideology frequently more or less independently of his work as an artist. He has views on politics, on sex, on ethics as well as on the work of other artists. More often consciously, sometimes unconsciously, these ideas influence his treatment of the subjects and people he chooses to write about and also to a large extent what subjects and people he writes about. This is unavoidable, even if the writer in question wishes to try and avoid it. There is no such thing as "pure art," though probably music approaches nearest to that ideal. The Ideology of the writer inevitably influences his writing and especially is this so with writers who have a conscious political and social Ideology. This being the case, the only really relevant question is: to what extent is it desirable for Ideology to influence literature and, more important, in what manner is its influence to be exerted?

During the last decade of the thirties it was commonly held, especially by the school of "proletarian literature," most of whose practitioners and advocates were Communists or fellow-travellers, that all literature should be produced with a conscious social purpose, and that the object of writing was not to give pleasure—that was a bourgeois anachronism—but to convince and convert the reader to a particular viewpoint. This usually meant in practice the viewpoint or policy of the Communist Party. There was no essential difference, it was maintained, between literature and propaganda. In fact literature was to be judged almost solely by its value as propaganda. Otherwise it was "useless" and, in the future society as envisaged by the comrades, it would not be allowed to exist unless it served the interests of the workingclass. This was a tactful and euphemistic way of saying the interests of the ruling minority of Party Members.

This attitude was based largely on the assumption, which superficially might appear to have some validity, that artists, and writers in particular, could not remain neutral in the social struggle, and that he who is not with us is against us. Actually this was a plausible rationalisation of an instinctive realisation, that no dictatorship, not even of the proletariat, can afford to tolerate independent observers in the society over which it rules. Most authoritarian political philosophers from Plato onwards, have seen clearly, that the artist and writer, unless carefully supervised, would always prove a potential threat to the stability of any totalitarian regime. And they were right in attaching so much importance to having their writers under proper control for, apart from much so-called "popular literature" which usually tends to reinforce the existing ideology, the social effect of unfettered art and literature has always inclined to be subversive.

This might seem to imply that the advocates of "proletarian literature" were right and that literature cannot in fact remain neutral; and indeed they were right, though not for the reasons that they put forward. Literature cannot, it is true, remain neutral in the sense that it has no social effect whatsoever. But it is equally true that literature cannot be consciously partisan in the sense that the writer deliberately seeks to propagate a particular Ideology. Such art very quickly deteriorates and ceases either in its self-imposed aim of "instructing," or even to

entertain for the reason that it is longer convincing to us. In order that it may appeal to us, or indeed have any positive effect on us at all, it is necessary that any work of art convince us by its plausibility, and by its own inherent logic, so that we feel, instinctively and intellectually, that it could not very well be other than it is. When, on the contrary we feel that the development of any particular work of art has been conditioned by a preconceived purpose that is not, and never was, an integral part of its growth we do not feel this.

It is a safe generalization to say that very little first-rate art has had a conscious didactic purpose. Where it has it has been great in spite of it and not because of it. Art does not deliberately set out to prove anything. It does not attempt to solve a problem, though it may pose a problem, and where it does solve a problem, the solution is always implicit rather than explicit, implied rather than stated, for the reason that, if the work of art in question is convincing as an organic whole, it is unnecessary to state it. This also applies very largely even to propaganda as such, which is more likely to succeed in its avowed task of trying to put across a particular case when it concentrates primarily on stating the facts of that case as clearly as possible, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions, rather than trying to force conclusions upon him, as being self-evident. They may be self-evident to the propagandist, but they will not be to the reader or hearer unless he is at least given a chance of coming to them by himself.

I have stated that the "purpose" of literature is to give pleasure. That is, of course, something of an over-simplification almost inevitable perhaps in a short article. But I have deliberately chosen to give emphasis to this fundamental aspect of literature because it is apt nowadays to be forgotten and even sometimes denied. I have also emphasized it to make clear the distinction between literature on the one hand and philosophy and Ideology on the other. Philosophy and Ideology seek to know and to understand and to convince by reason. Literature seeks merely to portray. If the writer wishes to give certain facts, or to express a particular opinion, he will of course do so but independently of his work as an artist.

This apparent neutrality and detachment of literature, its being a reflection and a portrayal of life and the human personality, while at the same time giving us glimpses of what life might and could be, hinting at Man's vast potentialities, all this makes literature one of the greatest forces in the progress of the Human Spirit. As such all great art and literature are revolutionary in effect. But for this art must be free, free not only from exterior censorship, but also from the self-imposed censorship of the artist himself.

The influence of Ideology on literature, is, we can say, therefore, bound to be considerable, but that influence will be beneficial only if it is assimilated by literature and becomes an integral part of it—not if the Ideology is consciously infused into it. If the tale has a moral it should be obvious to us without the artist having to point it out.

GERALD VAUGHAN.

Ethics and Anarchists

NO ANARCHIST HAS EVER DOUBTED or disputed the fact that the philosophy of anarchism rests chiefly on an ethical basis. It was with this fact in mind that I advanced the thesis that there is an ethical relationship between vegetarianism and anarchism.

In contesting this (in *The Food We Eat*, May-June, 1948, *Resistance*), Paul Goodman employs psychology incorrectly. At the very outset he concedes that the vegetarian takes the matter of diet seriously and that opponents of vegetarianism "do not habitually keep this in mind with equal seriousness." He admits, too, that those people who keep the question of eating from their thoughts and feeling are superficial persons and as such "are bad judges in ethics and we must listen to the vegetarian with respect." Then Goodman assumes the role of the class-room professor, lecturing to the vegetarians "to look deeper into their motives than is customary with them."

Goodman makes his psychological objection to vegetarianism by asserting "quite positively," in italicized print, that: "if we are looking for the ideal condition of spontaneity, fearless creative life and enjoyment, it is necessary for us to face up to, to admit to ourselves, and to feel whatever nausea and savage-biting is within us."

Is this a genuine psychological approach? The *Encyclopedia Britannica* sets forth the following as basic precepts of psychology: 1. Reflex Action; 2. Variability; 3. Spontaneity; 4. Educability; 5. Intelligence. Why Goodman omitted both educability and intelligence from his supposedly psychological approach becomes more obviously clear when he states that "Right ethics is a flowering of the underlying nature. An ethics that would be in contradiction with the underlying nature must lead to frustration, repression, loss of love and spontaneity. Conceivably one might risk these things for some great factor of safety, but not for an 'ideal.'" All this is brought forth in order to strengthen the idea of the "ideal condition" which is, of course, the one of the non-vegetarian, "nausea and savage-biting" notwithstanding.

Evidently Goodman did not remember that he had stated that "to attain the ideal attitude we must go through the vegetarian crisis." One may therefore assume that Goodman has gone through the "crisis." Crisis! As a vegetarian for over forty years, I can say that I feel nothing short of mental anguish and an offense to my sense of smell when I am present during a partaking of flesh food. Which reaction is more ethical, that reached by the vege-

tarian through a process involving educability and intelligence, or that of the non-vegetarian who presents a psychological picture with the omission of both educability and intelligence?

The answer to this challenging question is furnished by Prof. John Frederick Dashell in the final paragraph of his searching presentation of Psychology (*Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 22, 1946 ed.):

"The attitude of psychology to other values of life is sometimes misunderstood. To call it a natural and social science preoccupied with the True does not imply any lack of sympathy with the Beautiful and the Good. As with other sciences, its business is to discover those relationships of dependence and co-variation (cause and effect) that make natural processes (in this case, human) amenable to man's control—in the service of other values."

From the true psychological approach, then, the anarchist vegetarian strengthens the values of the anarchist philosophy, which strives for a society where beauty, goodness and justice will prevail. It is Goodman, and not the vegetarian, who needs to "look deeper into" his "motives."

The aim of the arts and sciences—especially social sciences—has always been to inspire and interest the thinking man into bringing about those changes in his life that will ultimately be of benefit to all mankind. In striving to achieve that state of happiness, many rebels, including artists and scientists, have willingly undergone ordeals and suffered persecutions in its many forms. Conversely, if, according to Goodman, man is to risk things only for—safety and not for an ideal, then some of the world's rebels and leading men of letters have erred. How much poorer and sadder, intellectually and socially, humanity would be if this faulty reasoning had been followed!

Goodman believes that I erred when I pointed out that Kropotkin failed to draw the logical conclusion from his own premise that man became omnivorous when the Glacial Age destroyed all vegetation—a premise which leaves no justification for man's failure to return to his original vegetarian status amidst a world abounding in vegetation. In support of his contention that man, having become omnivorous, has undergone a "biological change" and would, therefore, suffer if he returned to his original habits, Goodman concludes: "Right ethics is a flowering of the underlying nature." This, it seems to me, is twisting logic. As a psychologist, he should be found in the forefront advo-

cating man's return to his original status of vegetarian. It is evident that, in a biological sense, man lost considerably by the change which natural uncontrollable causes forced on him. Various medical schools of thought, in fact, omit flesh food from the diet of ill persons, and some of the more advanced flatly advocate vegetarianism and fruitarianism as the ideal for man.

Goodman criticizes my interpretation of justice for all living species that it is "divorced from the biological, psychological and esthetic sentiments that constitute the living justice of social happiness." To him it is self-evident that "justice" and "happiness" are to prevail only for the human species, since he does not consider animals as "responsible beings." In drawing an analogy between the animal which devours another (he does not state that these are very few) and the "mutual slaughtering of organized armies" of men, he fails to realize the contradiction of his own thesis which concedes to man the ability to reason and denies it to the animal. If this premise is correct, the actions of man, then, must be actions of responsibility by virtue of his power of reason. But Goodman's analogy itself places man exactly in the same category of the unreasonable animal. Yet, even this assumption is questionable in view of the fact that no animal is known to deliberately engage in the brutal game of hunting, trapping and killing human beings while man callously indulges in doing these things to the animals. It is more logical to assert that the animal species displays, instinctively, a far higher ethical sense of reasoning than does man. Man's eating of flesh foods is not an instinctive natural desire. It is an artificially created one and cannot be justified from any psychological or anarchist point of view. Furthermore, by what standards of ethics does Goodman assign to man the right to slaughter any animals at all? Does he really think that omnivorous man is fit to bring into being "a living justice of social happiness" as long as he continues to slaughter animals for food?

In searching for flaws, Goodman attributes to me the statement that to "kill an enemy is just." What I wrote was that in "resisting every form of oppression, man is at war with a real and visible enemy," and "in this sphere the anarchist is fully justified in not being a pacifist." There is no contradiction in this position. The animal man slaughters for food may occasionally interfere with man's raising of crops, out of necessity or unawareness as to what constitutes "private property." Seldom, if ever, do animals harm man physically. If man were to act instinctively, as do the animals, he would not harm them any more than he is harmed by them.


If, at the outset, Goodman concedes that he and his fellow meat-eaters are "bad" judges of ethics, by the time he ends his article one finds him, again in italics, setting up (lo and behold) a

rule in ethics. But what an *ethical rule!* "Dare to . . . study . . . your diet . . . your furcoat, your contraception . . . act freely according to desire." The cynicism implied becomes even more blunt by illustration—"a man might find that his pleasure in meat is not great enough to stand against the thought of the lively lamb made still and dead; yet when he has planned a sociable party for his friends, the lamb might seem a worthy offering!" Man is known to have offered human beings, and later animals, as sacrifices to "gods" and "idols." And anarchists in particular are known in man's struggle for freedom as the most uncompromising foes of human or animal sacrifices to any gods or other form of superstition. It is, therefore, most surprising to find Goodman, as an anarchist, suggesting a continuation of the animal form of sacrifice for human devourment.

Finally, Goodman feels very unhappy about "anarchist-vegetarians, as exemplars in society of a high ethical ideal," conceding, though, that it would be "good propaganda, people would say they are not fakers, they live up to it." Such a course, he argues, would not "bring freedom and happiness, but rather . . . heighten the guilty conscience of our neighbors. But the conscience is already far too guilty." If Goodman's premise is a correct one, then all anarchist propaganda may as well cease. The only thing left for us to do is, as he concludes, to "smile like Gandhi and live as long as Bernard Shaw."

Witnessing how humanity, through the State, allows itself to be ruled and continuously ruined, physically and intellectually—since the days of Bakunin's vast revolutionary activity—one doubts whether Goodman's deductions and advice are tenable. The proof of this lies in the very method he employs in his reaction to my thesis that the anarchist, in conformity with his ethical concept of justice, truth and beauty, should be a vegetarian. He prefers to have people say of anarchists: Their sermons are wonderful, but their way of life is no different from our own. No, Paul Goodman, my concept of anarchism and vegetarianism's ethical relationship to it has not as yet succeeded in arousing your own guilty conscience, let alone that of your non-anarchist neighbor. Anarchism if it is ever to become part of man's life, must begin with ourselves. Vegetarianism, as a way of life, has a most significant ethical relationship to anarchism as an ideal and, therefore, to anarchists as adherents to that ideal. Incidentally, Goodman completely ignores the fact that the *Encyclopédie Anarchiste* devotes 12½ pages to an exposition in favor of vegetarianism and not one line in favor of meat-eating. This is a significant fact that should not be overlooked by anarchists the world over.

—MARCUS GRAHAM



Editorial note: for reasons of space, it has been necessary to abridge these letters somewhat.

Editor:

In your last issue you say that you do not wish to engage in a polemic with Ludlow, editor of *Catholic Worker*, and then you proceed to engage in a good one with him. Why not engage in a polemic with Ludlow?

In this polemic, you say "At best Jesus is superfluous, at worst he leads to Christianity."

How do you know that he is superfluous? Are Ludlow and the Catholics the only ones who know anything about Jesus?

Suppose it should turn out that Jesus, like you and me, was not only an anarchist but also an atheist. Would he then be superfluous? Suppose it turns out that so far as religion is concerned, Jesus was not a Catholic, nor a Christian, but a Jew. Then he would not be leading us back to Christianity, any more than Abraham or Moses.

I am not a Christian.

I am an anarchist and an atheist, but I get my anarchism and my atheism entirely from the Bible. The god of today is no different from the gods of antiquity. Is Jesus denied the gods of antiquity he was an atheist, and for the same reasons that he was an atheist then he would be an atheist today, in spite of a million Ludlows.

I would like to support your paper, but I cannot do it so long as your eyes are closed, and you affirm that Jesus, or any other anarchist-atheist of history, is, or was, superfluous.

Edward Holton James
Concord, Mass.

* * *

Gentlemen:

Someone has sent me a copy of your issue of December last . . . in which you said: "Under religion man reduces himself to insignificance beside his God. On the contrary, man himself should be his primary concern. We should be aggressively concerned with our own interests, and not seek first of all the welfare of a deity or spirit."

The above would be the most stable foundation on which world slavery could be erected . . . the philosophy of the German concentration camp and the Russian salt mine. The world of nature is built on spoliation. . . . Materialistic philosophy is an extension of this savagery to man, and nothing but the idea

of man's responsibility to a Creator can tame this natural urge of animals and men to "concern themselves aggressively with their own interests," and to introduce universal slavery.

Believers in religion are not necessarily the weak-minded and misguided people the atheist blandly assumes them to be. We know that we had a Creator, seeing that we did not create ourselves, and that we have some duties towards him, one of which is that we "love one another." Religion is nothing but the acknowledgment of our duties to this creator. Under the obligation to love one another, thousands of men and women have devoted their lives. . . .

I believe that all who are sincerely devoted to human welfare would be well advised to stop the warfare on God, and to concentrate on laws which would end monopoly and special privilege, and leave every man equally free to the resources of the earth which the Creator made for the use of all. . . . There would never have been a demand to abolish God if we had not sequestered his gifts and left his children helpless.

If the search for human freedom must be based on atheism, leaving man with no responsibility except to his own "primary interests," there will always be men whose primary interests will necessitate our introduction to the salt mine or the gas chamber.

H. J. F.
Jamaica, N. Y.

* * *

Dear Comrade Editor:

. . . It is my contention that an anarchist should accept ideas and concepts solely on their merits and their soundness in relation to anarchist principles. If, in the light of reason and criticism, an idea is proved unsound, we should reject it regardless of how learned and respected its expounder may be. Belief in the supernatural remains absurd even if some outstanding comrade has professed it. Only recently and to my great amazement I learned the Elisee Reclus held some religious beliefs, but I do not know of any other anarchist thinker who was a believer in the supernatural, in god. . . . I believe you stretch the point a bit when you state that comrade Camillo Berneri was "an agnostic if not religious." Agnostic, yes; religious, definitely not. It may be that you mistake for religiousness Berneri's well known great spirit of tolerance toward religious people.

. . . You will do a "service" to anarchism if you fight religious beliefs on the same degree you fight any other social evil which contributes to the suppression of individual freedom and expression. Religious beliefs, even when they are called "personal mystical concepts" are never *personal*. They necessarily affect the behavior of the individual who professes them, and, consequently, they affect social conditions. The vague, mysterious, mystical feelings of yesterday are the religions of today:

the "unexplainable," personal mystical concepts of today will be the religions of tomorrow. This is inevitable unless, in the light of continuous rational criticism, we shall prove these concepts to be absurdities brought about by man's own limitations and his unwillingness to recognize them instead of resorting to supernatural comfort and assistance: something to lean on.

. . . Individuals with certain anarchist ideas can call themselves anarchists: we have neither party membership cards to dispense, nor disqualifications to launch. However, I sincerely believe that individuals who call themselves anarchists do a disservice to anarchism and create a damaging confusion by identifying themselves with the activities of organized religions. I see confusion and contradiction on the part of one of your frequent contributors when he resorts to peddling biblical fables as artistic subject matter and to the advocacy of better and more artistic synagogues, stating that Biblical and Hellenic symbols, "—the proposition that the Messiah will come—are the essence of social hope." (See "Modern Artist as Synagogue Builder" by Percival and Paul Goodman in *Commentary* for January, 1949.) I see the same kind of confusion and contradiction caused by one of your persistent critics when he effaces and debases his own individuality and wretchedly sacrifices man's dignity on the altar of an imaginary all-exacting god. (See poem by Ammon A. Hennacy in the *Catholic C.O.* for Spring, 1948.)

Anarchist principles, I venture to say, are decidedly human and basically concerned with promoting man's freedom and happiness through his own efforts and right here, in this world. Supernatural

concepts—bringing man to seek his individual freedom and integration outside his own self—are deceptions.

Michael Redcliff
* * *

Dear Sir:

. . . If you will attest to the sincerity and courage of your convictions by publishing this third-sided response to you both (for I am sending this communication to *The Catholic Worker* and to *Resistance*) I would like herewith to suggest the living sphere of reconciliation in which your seemingly irreconcilable points of view can discover their hidden unity.

. . . No man would ever claim to know the whole of truth. At least no man humbly and passionately devoted to truth would. A man can only know truth by *experiencing truth*, and the brevity of a single life-time is too limited to do more than experience a small measure of its fathomless infinity. Therefore each man's perception of truth is unique and worthy of being heeded and imaginatively experienced by his comrades. *And there is no experience of truth that excludes or denies any other experience of truth.* To try to build ecclesiastical walls or barricades around any experience of truth in order to retain or defend it is to lose that truth. . . . To deny another man's devotion to truth because it is totally different from our own is to have our own fade and grow lifeless, leaving us clutching only the empty husk of dogma.

A sincere Catholic devoted to the truth is of necessity an uncritical person. No one, save an uncritical person, could continue to give his devotion to a Church that supports Franco, has such creatures as Father Coughlin as its or-

ained priests, and with great fanfare and publicity gloatingly parades depressing public figures as its eminent converts. But it is really brutal and cruel to confront a sincere Catholic with these things. And even though they are not his doings, he accepts the guilt of them with secret shame and anguish.


. . . It doesn't so much matter whether a Church (or a political credo) is worthy or not; what matters supremely is the quality of love which a Church (or political credo) evokes in a man. . . . Love is truth, and love is greater than truth, for love alone encompasses all truth in its cosmic entirety.

. . . Think, just think of Nicola Sacco's love, which was truth . . . of Vanzetti's . . . of Rosa Luxemburg's . . . of Ernst Toller's . . . of Saint Francis of Assisi's . . . of Father Damien's . . . of Gandhi's. One could go on endlessly, passing through all churches and political credos, and the very names are a litany of gladness and delight to one's heart.

Is there any thoughtful anarchist or Catholic who would suggest that these beloved persons . . . would not gladly have cooperated and mingled with one another in the common cause of man's liberation into unity? And since they would have, why not you?

. . . Keep the doors wide open between your households, for truth will be more easily won by all of you when you step out into that wider sphere beyond political dogma and church dogma—the sphere in which truth has its dwelling, the sphere in which the still unrealized unity of us all lies wondrously encompassed.

James P. Cooney
Haydenville, Mass.



STALINGRAD, by Theodor Plievier. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 357 pp. \$3.00.

One brain, at the top of the bureaucracy, dominating with absolute will, controlling every life with unquestioned power, issued the order. It was a simple order. The German Sixth Army, hopelessly trapped in the pocket at Stalingrad, was ordered by Hitler to fight to the end. The order was an executioner's sentence, prescribing death for 300,000 men, a necessary sacrifice that the one brain continue to function as the symbol of infallibility. Plievier relates the utterly horrifying and horrible story of the destruction of these men.

Few men have ever been as cursed by fate as were these Germans. Their annihilation proceeded within and without. Without were the external "enemies": the indiscriminating elements of hunger, disease, and the terrible Russian winter; and the purposeful element, the thousands of tons of searing metal from the Russian guns. Within the annihilation was a consequence of that long process whereby the men had come to accept as the supreme law of their life these three words: "I will obey."

The most terrifying aspect of the story, and its great achievement, is that it makes clear in descriptions of overwhelming power that there is a point at which human beings can be so completely burned out as to be beyond possessing either a will to live or a will to death.

The work is based on the author's own observations and on the narratives of the German prisoners of war. It's the first picture of the German soldier of World War II.

Plievier, a German, had been working for the Russian government. He has since broken with Stalinism, managed to escape, and now lives in the American zone of Germany.

A.Q.L.

To Our Readers:

Again *Resistance* is lamentably late. Money was not, however, the only reason for the lateness of this issue. We have managed to pay the balance owed on the May-June issue, and *Resistance* is now clear of debt, but we were strongly reluctant to send the issue to the printer until we had sufficient articles of good caliber (we are still not satisfied). The paper needs money in order to appear, but it is useless to come out without content that justifies the cost. So we are directing a particular appeal for articles. Comrades and friends who can send us articles, either theoretical or (best of all) based on first-hand knowledge, will help *Resistance* represent anarchist thought more adequately and in more rounded fashion.

Attention of New York readers is drawn to the weekly anarchist discussion at SIA hall (813 Bdw. betw. 11th & 12th Sts., 3rd floor); discussions 3:30 p.m. every Saturday, except when there is a party in the evening. Among topics covered this winter have been Anarchists in Fiction, Germany Revisited, Popular Culture, Psychology of the Soviet Bureaucracy, pacifism, draft resistance, political action and "natural politics," education of children, Thorstein Veblen, Rosa Luxemburg, Poetry & Reality, etc. Other good discussions are being planned. Post-card notices will be sent on request.

The article "Anarchism" in the last issue of *Resistance*, setting forth the thoughts of the editorial group, has provoked good discussion, has been reprinted by *Freedom* in England, *Volontà* in Italy and *Etudes anarchistes* in France.

The Modern School notifies us that Elizabeth Ferm's book, *Freedom in Education*, will be ready in April. Advance sale at \$1.50 is made by E. B. Ferm Publications, The Modern School, Stelton, New Jersey.

In December one of our best comrades died, John Lamb of Centralia, Wash. One of the "Centralia Wobblies," he spent years in prison in the frameup after the 1919 massacre and

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Printing, Vol. 7, No. 4.....	291.97
	\$345.44
Balance.....	\$257.42
Deficit, November 15, 1948.....	189.21
Balance, February 28, 1949.....	\$ 68.21

the murder of Wesley Everest. An active Wobbly, John Lamb became an anarchist, opposed the centralizing and reformistic tendencies in the I.W.W.; his letters to *Resistance* were long a source of encouragement.

Bulgaria, A New Spain, recently published by the Alexander Berkman Fund in Chicago, contains the story of what has happened to our Bulgarian comrades since the Stalinist conquest; it also contains an excellent summary of the history of anarchist and libertarian movement in Bulgaria. All proceeds from this pamphlet (see *Bookshelf*) go to relief of anarchist and other anti-fascist refugees from Bulgaria.

The Anarchist Bookshelf

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Retort.....	40c
The Ark.....	50c
Poetry and Anarchism, by Herbert Read.....	\$1.25
An Appeal to the Young, by Peter Kropotkin.....	10c
Bulgaria, a New Spain.....	25c

Free and available on request are Randolph Bourne's "The State," "War or Revolution" and "Freedom" from England.

RESISTANCE

Vol. 7 - No. 4

March, 1949

Editors: *Resistance Group*

Resistance, an anarchist review, is supported solely by voluntary contributions. Subscriptions are free on request. Editorial contributions are invited from our readers.

IMPORTANT: Make all money orders and checks payable to D. Rogers, sec'y-treas., *Resistance*, Box 208 Cooper Station, New York 3, N. Y.



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